Thanks for laying this out, David. I'm in the Option 3 camp, too (see my "Against Physicalism"), but more radically. For example, Davidsonian anomalous monism doesn't go far enough: like many others he thinks that token identities are significantly weaker than type identities, but they're not.
It's in Hornsby and Fricker's Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy and in my Shifting Ground. If you email me (naomi@umn.edu) I can send you (or anyone else) a pdf.
Thanks for laying this out, David. I'm in the Option 3 camp, too (see my "Against Physicalism"), but more radically. For example, Davidsonian anomalous monism doesn't go far enough: like many others he thinks that token identities are significantly weaker than type identities, but they're not.
Where can i find "Against Physicalism"?
It's in Hornsby and Fricker's Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy and in my Shifting Ground. If you email me (naomi@umn.edu) I can send you (or anyone else) a pdf.
Oh yes, please! dsmith@une.edu
Please send a .pdf to me as well. kurtzs@ncf.ca
I'm stuck in physicalism. According to science, there are no calorie free thoughts, feelings, memories, perceptions, actions... even awareness.