Thanks for laying this out, David. I'm in the Option 3 camp, too (see my "Against Physicalism"), but more radically. For example, Davidsonian anomalous monism doesn't go far enough: like many others he thinks that token identities are significantly weaker than type identities, but they're not.
Sorry I wasn’t following this thread. But I can send the pdf. No disagreement with what you say, Steven B. Kurtz, but that’s a far cry from any identification of a mental phenomenon with some physical particular.
It's in Hornsby and Fricker's Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy and in my Shifting Ground. If you email me (naomi@umn.edu) I can send you (or anyone else) a pdf.
Depends on what’s understood by physicalism. If it’s that there’s nothing but physical stuff, that’s fine; if it’s that all mental particulars are physical particulars, then no: that’s demonstrably false. That’s Davidsonian anomalous monism, & it doesn’t work.
Thanks for laying this out, David. I'm in the Option 3 camp, too (see my "Against Physicalism"), but more radically. For example, Davidsonian anomalous monism doesn't go far enough: like many others he thinks that token identities are significantly weaker than type identities, but they're not.
Sorry I wasn’t following this thread. But I can send the pdf. No disagreement with what you say, Steven B. Kurtz, but that’s a far cry from any identification of a mental phenomenon with some physical particular.
Where can i find "Against Physicalism"?
It's in Hornsby and Fricker's Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy and in my Shifting Ground. If you email me (naomi@umn.edu) I can send you (or anyone else) a pdf.
Oh yes, please! dsmith@une.edu
Please send a .pdf to me as well. kurtzs@ncf.ca
I'm stuck in physicalism. According to science, there are no calorie free thoughts, feelings, memories, perceptions, actions... even awareness.
There is nothing incompatible with physicalism in this position
Depends on what’s understood by physicalism. If it’s that there’s nothing but physical stuff, that’s fine; if it’s that all mental particulars are physical particulars, then no: that’s demonstrably false. That’s Davidsonian anomalous monism, & it doesn’t work.
Ah, here we come apart. I find Davidson’s position immensely appealing